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Résumé /Abstract
Nous montrons que l’asymétrie d’information peut ne causer aucune distorsion
dans la différentiation des produits. Ce résultat va à l’encontre de ceux prévalant dans
la littérature sur les signaux, littérature qui soutient que l’asymétrie d’information
modifie de manière non négligeable les comportements stratégiques. Une analyse
approfondie des contre-incitations pour la dissimulation d’information révèle des
modifications sous-jacentes importantes menant aux mêmes observations d’équilibre
en information complète et incomplète. L’absence de modifications apparentes dans
les localisations d’équilibre repose sur des changements invisibles dans les stratégies,
le suiveur modifiant de façon cruciale sa meilleure réponse à la localisation de la firme
établie.
We show that information asymmetry may not cause any distortion in product
differentiation. This contrasts with the main result of the literature on signaling which
stresses that information asymmetry has a non negligible impact on strategic
behavior. A thorough analysis of the counter-incentives for information concealment
shows that much is going on beneath the surface to yield the same equilibrium
behaviors under complete and incomplete information. The absence of visible changes
in equilibrium locations relies on invisible changes in strategies. There is a crucial
modification in the follower's best response to the incumbent's location due to
incomplete information.
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1 Introduction
In a spatial competition context under incomplete information, mimicry needs space to be ef-
fective. However, the extent of product di®erentiation is naturally con¯ned by the market
boundaries interpreted either literally as geographic limits or as extreme varieties delimiting
the scope of consumers' tastes. We examine this idea in the present article by analyzing the
robustness of the d'Aspremont et al. (1979) \maximum di®erentiation principle" to the intro-
duction of asymmetric information. Following d'Aspremont et al. (1979), we assume mill price
competition and quadratic transportation costs. The assumption of quadratic transportation
costs can be defended on two grounds. First, in preference space, it is the natural assumption to
make: the loss in utility (from tuning, redesigning, adapting) experienced by a consumer, when
the characteristics of the product he buys di®er from his own most preferred product character-
istics, is increasingly large the further away the product location is.1 Second, the assumption is
a simple way to obtain the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium in price, a major theoretical
problem in the Hotelling linear framework.
In a ¯rst analysis of competition over product characteristics (spatial) under incomplete in-
formation published in a recent issue of this journal, Boyer et al. (1994) showed that product
di®erentiation will indeed be distorted by incomplete information. In their duopoly sequential
location model with discriminatory pricing and linear transportation costs, ¯rm 1 is either a
low or high cost ¯rm while ¯rm 2 is a high cost ¯rm. Firm 1 is an incumbent ¯rst mover ¯rm
which chooses its location or product characteristics knowing its type while ¯rm 2 is a second
mover ¯rm ignoring the type of ¯rm 1, but choosing its location after observing the location of
¯rm 1. Under complete information, the presence of a low cost incumbent may generate more
or less di®erentiation than the presence of a high cost one. Under incomplete information, a low
cost incumbent distorts her full information location in order to credibly convey information on
her true cost. This distorted choice may deter mimicking by a high cost incumbent because it
reduces the degree of product di®erentiation and thereby increases price competition. However,
a high cost ¯rm 1 may gain in mimicking the location of its low cost counterpart by moving
aggressively towards the center of the market. Depending on the prior probabilities of the two
types of ¯rm 1, the blu® induces a move by ¯rm 2 away from the center but nevertheless product
di®erentiation is reduced. Hence information asymmetry matters in this product design compe-
tition context.2
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However, when \transportation" costs are assumed quadratic and borne by the consumers,
the story is quite di®erent. We develop in this paper such a model where, for a wide range of
parameter values, asymmetric information does not give rise to distortions in product di®eren-
tiation. Hence those results complement the results of Boyer et al. (1994, 1995) and allow a
better understanding of the role of asymmetric information in shaping strategic behavior. We
¯rst reconsider the complete information analysis of d'Aspremont et al. (1979) by including a
positive cost di®erential between the duopolists. We show that di®erentiation remains impor-
tant but in general not maximal, that is ¯rms need not locate at the end points of the market.
Restricting our analysis to cost di®erentials for which both ¯rms capture a positive market share
in equilibrium, we show that in an attempt to avoid harsh price competition in stage 2, the sec-
ond mover ¯rm locates in equilibrium at the fringe of the market even if it bene¯ts from a cost
advantage. We show that the extreme equilibrium of \maximum di®erentiation" is not distorted
by the incomplete information precisely because it is so extreme.
The intuition is the following: unlike what usually emerges in standard models of signaling,
the weak type, that is the high cost incumbent here, has no incentive to mimic the strong type by
moving towards the market center because such a strategic move would reduce di®erentiation,
hence increase price competition thereafter. As a result, signaling one's true type via location
may not require any distortion and incomplete information does not seem on the surface to play
an important role in spatial competition with quadratic transportation costs.
However, a thorough analysis of the counter-incentives for information concealment shows
that much is going on beneath the surface to yield the same equilibrium behaviors under com-
plete and incomplete information. The absence of visible changes in equilibrium locations relies
on invisible changes in the duopolists' strategies. In particular, there is a crucial modi¯cation in
the follower's best response to the incumbent's location due to incomplete information. When
the uninformed follower observes an incumbent's location near the opposite fringe of the market,
he di®erentiates his product to the maximum in equilibrium no matter what he believes about
the other's type: this is the same \puppy dog" strategy as the classical one leading to maximal
di®erentiation under complete information. By contrast, when the uninformed follower observes
an incumbent's location closer to the market center, he may spurn his extreme location to move
towards the market center, and may even reach the market center, if he is convinced to compete
against the high cost type, while he sticks to the market boundary if he thinks the incumbent
to be the low cost type. Anticipating the follower's reaction, the high cost incumbent cannot
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pro¯tably choose the same aggressive location, somewhat closer to the market center, as her
low cost counterpart. Indeed, even if by doing so he was thought to be the low cost type, her
competitor could not di®erentiate beyond the market boundary. But the high cost incumbent
achieves the same result { the follower's reaction at the opposite market boundary { with less
aggressive location involving more di®erentiation. In other words, by mimicking and blu±ng,
the high cost incumbent would reduce product di®erentiation without inducing the competitor
to move further away. Thus the high cost incumbent is better o® choosing her full information
equilibrium location: product di®erentiation is then maximal. Moreover the low cost incumbent
does not need to choose a distorted location and incur a signaling cost since mimicry is un-
pro¯table. Hence the low cost incumbent chooses also her full information equilibrium location:
product di®erentiation is maximal for small cost di®erentials and somewhat less than maximal
for large ones.
In section 2, we reconsider the analysis of d'Aspremont et al. (1979) under complete in-
formation and derive the perfect Nash equilibrium in locations for a wide range of parameter
values. In section 3, we present the model under asymmetric information and characterize the
duopolist's equilibrium choices in location. We discuss the robustness of our results to changes
in the assumptions on asymmetric information in section 4. We o®er concluding remarks in
section 5.
2 Basic Model Under Complete Information
We shall ¯rst recall the modi¯ed version of Hotelling's (1929) duopoly model proposed by
d'Aspremont et al. (1979). The only change we introduce in this section is that the two ¯rms
are assumed to bear di®erent unit production cost. Although slight, the modi¯cation gives rise
to new considerations since a lower [higher] cost competitor bene¯ts from more [less] market
power than a same cost competitor.
Consumers are uniformly distributed along an interval [0; `] and each consumer buys one unit
of some homogeneous product. The full price is the uniform mill price plus the transportation
cost incurred by the consumer. Firm 1 [2] locates within the left [right] half of the market area
at distance x1 [x2] from 0. Firm i; i = 1; 2, bears a constant marginal cost of production Ci.
Let ¢ denote the cost di®erential C1 ¡C2 and let p1 and p2 denote, respectively, the mill prices
of ¯rm 1 and ¯rm 2. The transportation cost is given by kd2, where k is a constant and d is the
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distance between the consumer and the ¯rm.
In this section the ¯rms are assumed to act under complete information. The game we
consider unfolds as follows: ¯rm 1 plays ¯rst and commits to its location; ¯rm 2 observes this
decision and chooses its own location; both ¯rms then set prices simultaneously. In the follow-
ing section, ¯rm 2 will be assumed to su®er from limited information and seek to infer ¯rm 1's
cost from observing its location. The ¯rms' pro¯ts and demand curves are derived in Appendix
A1. Conditions for a unique perfect price-location equilibrium to exist are met. As advocated
by Hotelling (1929) and d'Aspremont et al. (1979), when ¯rms choose their locations in stage
1, they both anticipate the consequences of their choice on price competition in stage 2. Non
credible threats are of no avail. The concept of perfect equilibrium captures this idea.
The concave demand and pro¯t functions ensure the existence of the Nash equilibrium in
prices, the expression of which is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The unique subgame perfect price equilibrium is given by
pN1 (x1; x2) =
1
3
(2C1 + C2 + k (x2 ¡ x1) (2` + x1 + x2))
pN2 (x1; x2) =
1
3
(C1 + 2C2 + k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` ¡ x1 ¡ x2)) : k
We obtain from these expressions, the ¯rms' reduced-form pro¯t functions conditional on their
locations. We ¯rst consider that ¯rm 1 bears higher cost, ¢ > 0, before considering the case
where ¢ < 0:
If ¯rm 1 su®ers from a cost disadvantage, price competition may drive prices down to a level
at which there is no demand for ¯rm 1's product. The incentive of ¯rm 2 to di®erentiate, that
is to choose a location away from that of ¯rm 1, may con°ict with the bene¯t it can obtain by
monopolizing the whole market. We show in Appendix A2 that, for values of ¢ su±ciently high
(¢=k > 5`2=4), given ¯rm 1's location, there exists an interval of locations in the neighborhood
of the market center, namely
·
`=2; ¡` +
³
(x1 + `)2 + ¢=k
´1=2¸
; which allows ¯rm 2 to capture
the whole market. Firm 1 is aware that price competition will be relaxed if it moves away from
the center, that is towards the left edge of the market. However the most stringent e®ort to
di®erentiate, that is locating at the left boundary of the market, may not be su±cient to get
a positive market share because the price competition may still be too severe for ¯rm 1. This
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would occur if ¯rm 2 had a large cost advantage or if the products could not be su±ciently
di®erentiated, either because the market is of insu±cient length (size) or because the factor k is
small, that is the marginal transportation cost is increasing too slowly with distance. For values
of ¢=k low enough, there exists a location interval in the neighborhood of the left edge, namely
in
h
0; ¡` + ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2´, that allows ¯rm 1 to enjoy a positive market share and pro¯t
whatever ¯rm 2's location. These results are summarized in Lemma 2 [with proof in Appendix
A2]. Let Di (x1; x2) denote ¯rm i's reduced-form demand function obtained by substituting the
expressions of the prices given in Lemma 1 into the demand function Di (x1; x2; p1; p2) derived
in Appendix A1.
Lemma 2: If 0 < ¢=k · 5`2=4 then, for any x1 2 [0; ¡` + ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 [ and any
x2 2 [`=2; `], we have D1 (x1; x2) > 0. If 5`2=4 · ¢=k then, for any x1 2 [0; `=2] and any
x2 2
·
`=2; ¡` +
³
(x1 + `)2 + ¢=k
´1=2¸
, we have D1 (x1; x2) = 0: k
We restrict our attention to values of ¢=k lower than 5`2=4 to ensure that both ¯rms are
present on the market in stage 2; from lemma 2, there exists a non-empty interval of locations
in the neighborhood of the left end point, that allows ¯rm 1 to get a positive market share and
pro¯t. Thus there is no possibility of entry foreclosure by ¯rm 2 for ¢=k 2 ¡0; 5`2=4¢
As established by the following proposition, maximal di®erentiation emerges in equilibrium
for values ¢=k 2 £0; `2¢ : Despite its higher production cost, ¯rm 1 obtains a positive market
share. Given that ¯rm 1 locates at the left edge of the market, ¯rm 2's optimal reaction is to
move as far away as possible. However ¯rm 2's best strategy may not be maximal di®erentiation
for some out of equilibrium location x1, even in a duopolistic situation. Let x+2 (x1) denote the
location to the left of ` that maximizes ¯rm 2's pro¯t. The expression of x+2 (x1) is given in
Appendix A3 together with the reduced-form pro¯t function ¼^(x1) of ¯rm 1.
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Proposition 1: If ¯rm 1 is a high cost ¯rm (¢=k > 0), the perfect Nash equilibrium location
strategies are given by:
1. If 0 · ¢=k · 3`2=4,
xN1 = 0 and x
N
2 (x1) =
(
`; for x1 2 [0; ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `)
`=2; for x1 2 [¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `); `=2]:
2. If 3`2=4 < ¢=k < `2,
xN1 = 0 and x
N
2 (x1) =
8>><>:
`; for x1 2 [0; ¡`2 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2]
x+2 (x1) ; for x1 2 [
¡
`2 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ; ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `´
`=2; otherwise:
3. If `2 < ¢=k < 5`2=4,
xN1 = 0 and x
N
2 (x1) =
(
x+2 (x1) ; for x1 2
h
0;
¡
9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `´
`=2; otherwise: k
The second part of Proposition 1 states that ¯rm 2 would choose to locate at x+2 (x1), that is not
decide to move as far as possible from its competitor, if ¯rm 1's location is su±ciently far from
both the left end point and the market center. However this reduction in product di®erentiation
would entail a decrease in ¯rm 1's pro¯t. Anticipating this, ¯rm 1 is better o® locating at the
left end point to induce maximal di®erentiation from ¯rm 2. Thus { and this is the main result
of the analysis under complete information { if ¯rm 1's location is observed to be su±ciently
close to the left end point of the market, ¯rm 2 sticks to the right edge despite its advantage in
production cost.
A fortiori, ¯rm 2 is expected to have such a puppy dog behavior when it incurs a higher cost
than ¯rm 1, that is when ¢ < 0. The analysis of this case is symmetric to the previous one: it
is now ¯rm 2's pro¯t which may be reduced to zero depending upon ¯rm 1's location. However,
for values of ¢=k larger than ¡5`2=4, ¯rm 2 can obtain a positive market share and pro¯t
by locating in the neighborhood of the right end point. More precisely, we state the following
lemma, the proof of which can be found in Appendix A4:
Lemma 3: If ¡5`2=4 < ¢=k · 0, then, for any x1 2 [0; `=2]
and any x2 2
³
2` ¡ ¡9`2=4 + ¢=k¢1=2 ; `i, we have pN2 (x1; x2) > C2 and D2 (x1; x2) > 0. k
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A glance at the expression of @¼2=@x2, given in Appendix A3, shows that, regardless of the
location of ¯rm 1, the pro¯t of ¯rm 2 increases with x2. Hence ¯rm 1 expects ¯rm 2's optimal
reaction to be at the right end point of the market whatever its own location. It follows from
the study of ¼^1 (x1), that is ¯rm 1's pro¯t given ¯rm 2's optimal reaction, that ¯rm 1's optimal
location is not always at 0.3
Proposition 2: If ¯rm 1 is a low cost ¯rm (¢=k < 0), the perfect Nash equilibrium location
strategies are given by
1. If ¡`2 · ¢=k · 0,
xN1 = 0 and x
N
2 (x1) = ` for any x1 2 [0; `=2] :
2. If ¡5`2=4 < ¢=k · ¡`2,
xN1 =
µ
` ¡
³
4`2 + 3¢=k
´1=2¶
=3 and xN2 (x1) = ` for any x1 2 [0; `=2] : k
Thus, if ¯rm 1's production cost is su±ciently low relative to that of ¯rm 2, maximal di®erenti-
ation does not occur in equilibrium. The reason is given by the expression of ¯rm 1's marginal
demand:
@D1 (x1; x2)
@x1
=
3` ¡ 5x1
6 (` ¡ x1) ¡
¢
6k (` ¡ x1)2 :
It can be seen that a huge cost di®erential has a direct impact on the increase in ¯rm 1's
market share when it moves toward the market center, hence the tendency that opposes maximal
di®erentiation is strengthened.
3 Asymmetric Information
Whatever the cost di®erence, either a cost advantage resulting from past experience or a cost
disadvantage resulting from the development of some form of X-ine±ciency, it is reasonable to
assume that it is a private information, at least in numerous cases. We will assume therefore
that, at the beginning of the game, ¯rm 1 learns its true production cost and that ¯rm 2 ignores
whether it has a cost advantage of not. Being uncertain about which ¯rm has the cost advantage,
¯rm 2 can act as a follower in location in order to infer some information about ¯rm 1's cost
from the observation of the latter's location choice.4 Understanding this, ¯rm 1 can in°uence
through its choice of location the inference ¯rm 2 will make about the true cost advantage and
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thus the latter's location choice.
Information about costs Ci; i = 1; 2, is therefore asymmetric: ¯rm 2's cost is common knowl-
edge while whether ¯rm 1's cost is high C1 or low C1 is a private information of ¯rm 1. We
will assume that ¯rm 2 believes a priori that it has a cost disadvantage
¡
¢ = C1 ¡ C2 < 0¢ with
probability ¹0; and a cost advantage
³
¢ = C1 ¡ C2 > 0
´
with probability 1¡ ¹0. The distribu-
tion of ¯rm 2's prior beliefs is common knowledge. Firm 2 will update its beliefs about the cost
di®erential after observing the location of ¯rm 1. Let ¹ (x1) be ¯rm 2's posterior belief that the
cost di®erential is negative (¯rm 1 is more e±cient) when ¯rm 1's location is x1. The objective
of ¯rm 2 is then to maximize its expected pro¯t given its beliefs. In order to focus attention
on the strategic interactions, we restrict the analysis to the following range of parameter values:
¢=k belongs to
¡¡5`2=4; 0¢ and ¢=k belongs to ¡0; `2¢.
Although ¯rm 2 may not know the true cost of ¯rm 1 at the location stage (unless it is
perfectly inferred from ¯rm 1's location choice), ¯rm 2 is assumed to learn this cost before price
competition takes place. Such an assumption is consistent with the view that location choices
are long-run decisions made before all market conditions are known but that over time the
cost parameters of all ¯rms will become perfectly known because of the repeated interactions
on markets. We do not model this process but rather assume that in the second stage the
¯rms compete in prices under complete information about cost conditions and current demand
conditions. Modeling second stage short run competition as a complete information game is a
standard assumption in the literature on asymmetric information games since the seminal work
of Milgrom and Roberts (1982). We will discuss the robustness of our results to the relaxation
of this assumption in the next section.
We de¯ne ¼i (x1; x2; C1), i = 1; 2; as the pro¯t of ¯rm i resulting from the short run compe-
tition in prices, when the pair of locations is (x1; x2) and ¯rm 1 bears cost C1. Let M denote
the set of all probability distributions de¯ned on
n
C1; C1
o
and x^2 : [0; `=2] £ M ¡! [`=2; `] be
¯rm 2's best response function so that x^2(x1; ¹) is the location chosen by ¯rm 2 with beliefs
¹ 2 M given location x1 of ¯rm 1.
Calculations similar to those of Appendix A3 lead to:
@¼1 (x1; x2; C1)
@x1
=
(k (x2 ¡ x1) (2` + x1 + x2) ¡ ¢) (k (x2 ¡ x1) (x2 ¡ 3x1 ¡ 2`) ¡ ¢)
18k (x2 ¡ x1)2
9
It is then straightforward to obtain the following \single-crossing" property
@¼1
³
x1; x2; C1
´
@x1
<
@¼1
¡
x1; x2; C1
¢
@x1
:
Hence moving toward the market center is easier for the low cost ¯rm 1 than for the high cost
¯rm 1, or equivalently the cost of signaling one's type by locating closer to the market center is
positively correlated with the ¯rm's production cost. Under incomplete information, locations
somewhat closer to the market center by ¯rm 1 may be perceived as a signal of strength by ¯rm
2. Consequently, such locations may be at the same time attractive for a low cost ¯rm 1 willing
to signal its real strength and for its high cost counterpart willing to appear as a low cost ¯rm.
The idea is that mimicking the low cost type induces ¯rm 2 to di®erentiate more. However,
¯rm 2 cannot choose a location beyond the market boundary. If the extent to which ¯rm 2
di®erentiates its product is limited by the market boundary, mimicry is no longer attractive.
The analysis of location as a signal di®ers from the standard analysis in the literature on
signaling games, even if the modeling strategy we use is rather standard in the literature on
product di®erentiation. From Proposition 2, we know that under perfect information, ¯rm 2
has a dominant strategy, namely to locate at the right end point of the market when its cost
is higher than ¯rm 1. Furthermore, Proposition 1 shows that, when it bears a lower cost than
¯rm 1, ¯rm 2 adopts the same equilibrium location although not the same equilibrium strategy.
In particular, observing \puppy dog" locations near the opposite boundary induces ¯rm 2 to
behave also as a \puppy dog" by locating at the right end of the market while observing more
aggressive locations closer to the market center induces ¯rm 2 to respond aggressively at the
market center. Thus whatever ¯rm 2's beliefs regarding ¯rm 1's cost, it will choose to locate at
the right end point.5 It follows that the equilibrium locations under asymmetric information are
exactly the same as under complete information. Let xi (C1) denote the equilibrium location
chosen by ¯rm i where C1 is ¯rm 1's true cost.
Proposition 3: The equilibria are independent of ¹:
1. If ¡5`2=4 < ¢=k < ¡`2 and 0 < ¢=k < `2, we have a unique separating equilibrium:
x1
³
C1
´
= 0; x1
¡
C1
¢
=
µ
` ¡
³
4`2 + 3¢=k
´1=2¶
=3; x2
³
C1
´
= x2
¡
C1
¢
= `
2. If ¡`2 · ¢=k < 0 and 0 < ¢=k · `2, we have a unique pooling equilibrium:
x1
³
C1
´
= x1
¡
C1
¢
= 0; x2
³
C1
´
= x2
¡
C1
¢
= ` k
10
Proof: The equilibrium location xN1 under complete information maximizes on [0; `=2] the func-
tion ¼1 (x1; `; C1) de¯ned by ¼^1 (x1) for a given C1 (see Appendices A3 and A5 for an explicit
de¯nition of ¼^1 (x1) for each value of C1). The location xN2 (x1) = ` is ¯rm 2's best response to any
x1 for any value of ¢=k 2 ¡0; 3`2=4¢ (see Proposition 1) and for any value of ¢=k 2 ¡¡5`2=4; 0¢
(see Proposition 2). Thus, for any x1 in [0; minf¡`2 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ; ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `g), and
whatever ¹ 2 [0; 1], we have x^2 (x1; ¹) = `. Firm 2's beliefs do not in°uence its behavior, al-
though they a®ect its strategy: it locates at the right end point of the market. For all ¹ 2 [0; 1]
and all C1 2
n
C1; C1
o
, the location xN1 maximizes ¼1 (x1; x^2 (x1; ¹) ; C1) = ¼1 (x1; `; C1) on
[0; `=2]. Thus, were x1 di®erent from xN1 , any type of ¯rm 1 could deviate to xN1 and increase
its pro¯t. QED
Although the equilibrium locations are the same under complete and incomplete informa-
tion, it is important to realize that this results from the fact that in the ¯rst case of Proposition
3, ¯rm 2 does react to the potential blu® by the high cost ¯rm 1 when the latter deviates from
its equilibrium location xN1
³
C1
´
= 0. If the high cost ¯rm 1 imitates the low cost ¯rm 1 by
locating at x1
¡
C1
¢
=
³
` ¡ ¡4`2 + 3¢=k¢1=2´ =3, then ¯rm 2, believing (wrongly) that it is facing
a low cost ¯rm 1 would change its strategy from x+2 (0) to `. Hence, although no change in equi-
librium locations is observed, there is an important change in the strategy of ¯rm 2 supporting
the locations. However, one can check that the product di®erentiation obtained by mimicking,
namely ` ¡ x1(C1), is lower than the equilibrium product di®erentiation given by x+1 (0). The
reason is that ¯rm 2 is limited in its possibility to di®erentiate by the market boundary.
Unlike what happens in standard models of signaling, the weaker type of sender, that is the
high cost ¯rm 1 in the present model, has no incentive to mimic its stronger counterpart because
the signal received by ¯rm 2 does not change its behavior. Even in the case ¢=k 2 ¡¡5`2=4; ¡`2¢
where the low cost ¯rm 1 does not locate at the left boundary of the market when it is perfectly
identi¯ed, the high cost ¯rm 1 is worse o® if it deviates from 0. If it was to locate slightly to
the right of the left boundary in an attempt to trick its uninformed competitor, it would reduce
product di®erentiation, would make price competition more severe and would end up with a
reduction in pro¯t.
This characteristic of the location model is noteworthy: when the natural boundaries of the
market constrain a ¯rm to locate at the end point regardless of its beliefs, strategic imitation is
unpro¯table. The low cost ¯rm 1 is thereby not compelled to incur a distortion cost to separate
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itself, contrary to the usual case in the signaling literature. Therefore this low cost ¯rm chooses
the same location as under complete information.
The situation would change if ¯rm 2 observing ¯rm 1's location at the left end point had
enough space to react di®erently depending upon ¯rm 1's type. This would be the case for
values of ¢=k 2 ¡`2; 5`2=4¢. Then, given x1, ¯rm 2's best reaction would be to locate at the
boundary ` for su±ciently high values of ¹, but to the left of the end point for lower values of
¹, namely at x+2 (x1) =
µ
2 (x1 + `) +
³
(x1 ¡ 2`)2 ¡ 3¢=k
´1=2¶
=3 if ¯rm 1 was perceived to be
of the high cost type for sure (¹ = 0). Hence it could be pro¯table for the high cost ¯rm 1
to be perceived as a low cost ¯rm 1 in order to induce ¯rm 2 to locate further away. One can
then expect some distortions in locations or product characteristics to emerge with respect to
the equilibria under complete information. The analysis would then be the same as in Boyer et
al. (1994, 1995) modeling an industry where product di®erentiation is not constrained by the
market boundaries.
4 Robustness of the Results
Two main features characterize the information structure of the present model: ¯rst, there is
asymmetric information at the location stage where one of the ¯rms has imperfect information
about the rival's cost; second, there is perfect information at the price competition stage. We
discussed above the rationale for such assumptions. Nevertheless one can wonder how the results
would be a®ected were these assumptions relaxed.
Let us ¯rst consider what would happen at the location stage if each ¯rm was uncertain about
the other's cost. Clearly, if ¯rm 1 ignores ¯rm 2's cost, the latter will not distort its location
choice strategy unless the sequence of moves is changed. Since ¯rm 1 has already decided on
its location at the time ¯rm 2 locates, the latter's decision cannot in°uence the former's choice.
Moreover, ¯rm 2 has no incentive to distort its location to convey information since costs will be
perfectly known at the price setting stage. Therefore ¯rm 2's location strategy will remain the
same and it will locate at the right end point whether its cost is perfectly known to ¯rm 1 or not.
Firm 1, when imperfectly informed about ¯rm 2's cost, may not choose the same location
as in Proposition 3. In case 1 of Proposition 3, the equilibrium location of ¯rm 1 when fully
informed is shown to depend on whether its cost is higher or lower than ¯rm 2's cost. Under
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symmetric cost uncertainty, the ¯rst mover ¯rm 1 cannot do better than maximize its expected
pro¯t by choosing a location between x1(C1) and x1(C1) depending on its beliefs regarding ¯rm
2's cost. On the other hand, in case 2 of Proposition 3, ¯rm 1 will not change its location which
in equilibrium will remain at the left end point whatever its cost advantage or disadvantage.
Thus in that case, not knowing ¯rm 2's cost will not a®ect the location choice of ¯rm 1.
Let us now consider our assumption of complete information at the pricing stage. Let us
suppose that ¯rm 2 does not know ¯rm 1's cost at the price competition stage, which requires
a pooling equilibrium at the location stage. As suggested by an anonymous referee, \ ... the
low cost leader has incentive to pretend that it is a high cost ¯rm ... " when choosing location
to bene¯t from softer price competition with respect to the Bertrand equilibrium level under
complete information. Indeed if the location stage fails to reveal ¯rm 1's cost, we then face a
simultaneous move price setting competition game where one ¯rm is fully informed of market
conditions while the other has imperfect information on its rival's cost. The imperfectly informed
¯rm 2 will choose its price to maximize its expected pro¯t given the observed locations chosen
by the ¯rms at stage one and given that ¯rm 1 can be of one of two types. This price will be
between the high price ¯rm 2 would choose if ¯rm 1 is known to be of the high cost type and
the low price it would choose if ¯rm 1 is known to be of the low cost type and its exact price
level will depend on ¯rm 2's beliefs as to the cost of the incumbent. Hence, provided that ¯rm
2 fails to infer the true cost of ¯rm 1 at the location stage, ¯rm 2 will relax price competition
when perceiving ¯rm 1 to be more likely of the high cost type. Firm 1, knowing whether it
has a cost advantage or not and anticipating the price chosen by ¯rm 2, will choose its best
reply price which of course depends on whether it is a low cost ¯rm or a high cost ¯rm. If the
price chosen by ¯rm 1 reveals its type, then all subsequent price competition periods will be
characterized by perfect information. Then, for all practical purposes, the price competition
stage is a full information competition stage as in section 3 above. If on the other hand, the
price chosen by ¯rm 1 is independent of its type (pooling), then no information is revealed and
the ¯rst period short run equilibrium is inde¯nitely repeated. If a pooling equilibrium exists at
the pricing stage, meaning that information is conveyed neither through location nor through
price, we obtain a price rigidity that may have similar consequences to the result of Bester
(1998): relaxing price competition through spatial di®erentiation becomes less valuable, hence
the equilibrium outcome may be characterized by less di®erentiation when ¯rm 1 actually has
a cost advantage.
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5 Conclusion
We have shown that information asymmetry may not cause any distortion in product di®erenti-
ation. The result is obtained in the standard model of spatial competition under mill pricing and
quadratic transportation costs. This contrasts with the main result of the literature on signaling
which stresses that information asymmetry has a non negligible impact on strategic behavior. It
complements also the results derived by Boyer et al. (1994, 1995) under discriminatory pricing
and linear transportation costs where locations are indeed modi¯ed by the presence of signaling
costs.
In the standard version of Hotelling's framework, a ¯rm which observes its competitor's
location before choosing its own location always responds by locating at the end point of the
market. This tendency to move far apart (maximal di®erentiation) does not depend on the level
of its production cost as long as both ¯rms enjoy a positive market share and the market is
totally covered. Thus, when a ¯rm is uncertain of its competitor's e±ciency, its perception or
belief regarding the cost di®erential does not in°uence its strategic behavior: the ¯rm sticks to
the boundary of the market whatever its beliefs. The observation of the signal (location) sent
by the privately informed ¯rm keeps the uninformed ¯rm's response unchanged. The informed
¯rm in turn anticipates this when choosing its location, hence any distortion with respect to its
full information behavior is unpro¯table.
A noteworthy feature of our model is that a mimicking strategy to locate aggressively closer
to the market center fails to increase the pro¯t of the high cost ¯rm. Even if it is believed to be
a low cost ¯rm by the uninformed ¯rm, the latter cannot move further away than the market
end point. The presence of a signi¯cant ¯xed cost of entry could change this result since the
uninformed ¯rm's decision to enter or not would then depend on its observation of the informed
¯rm's location and on its inference regarding the cost di®erential.6 The result that ¯rms locate
as they would in a context of complete information could lead to the conclusion that information
does not matter under spatial competition. We know from Boyer et al. (1994, 1995) that it is
not true.
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APPENDIX
A1. The Demand Functions
Let Di (x1; x2; p1; p2) be the demand of ¯rm i. It is straightforward to show that for any x1 6= x2,
¯rms' demands are given, respectively, by
D1 (x1; x2; p1; p2) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0; if x1 + x22 +
p2 ¡ p1
2k (x2 ¡ x1) < 0
x1 + x2
2 +
p2 ¡ p1
2k (x2 ¡ x1) ; if 0 ·
x1 + x2
2 +
p2 ¡ p1
2k (x2 ¡ x1) · `
`; otherwise
D2 (x1; x2; p1; p2) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0; if 2` ¡ x1 ¡ x22 + p1 ¡ p22k (x2 ¡ x1) < 0
2` ¡ x1 ¡ x2
2 +
p1 ¡ p2
2k (x2 ¡ x1) ; if 0 ·
2` ¡ x1 + x2
2 +
p1 ¡ p2
2k (x2 ¡ x1) · `
`; otherwise
It is easily seen that, for any location pair (x1; x2), the pro¯t functions are quasi-concave in
prices, which ensures the existence of a corresponding price equilibrium and that this price
equilibrium is unique. Furthermore, the ¯rst-order necessary conditions yield the expressions
for those prices given in Lemma 1. By substituting them into the demand function of both ¯rms,
we get the expressions of the ¯rms' reduced-form pro¯t functions conditional on their locations.
A2. The Monopolization of the Market by Firm 2 (Lemma 2)
From the expressions of D1 (x1; x2; p1; p2) given in A1 above, and of pNi (x1; x2), i = 1; 2; given
in Lemma 1, some calculations show that for any x1 6= x2:
D1 (x1; x2) =
k (x2 ¡ x1) (2` + x1 + x2) ¡ ¢
6k (x2 ¡ x1) =
pN1 (x1; x2) ¡ C1
2k (x2 ¡ x1) :
Thus sign(D1 (x1; x2)) = sign
³
pN1 (x1; x2) ¡ C1
´
= sign
¡
x22 + 2`x2 ¡ x1 (2` + x1) ¡ ¢=k
¢
. The
latter function is parabolic in x2. Let x+2 be the largest root of the equation x
2
2 + 2`x2 ¡
x1 (2` + x1) ¡ ¢=k = 0. Then:
x+2 = ¡` +
p
±1 where ±1 = (x1 + `)2 + ¢=k:
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Hence, given x1, if x+2 is higher than `=2, then for any x2 · x+2 , D1 (x1; x2) = 0 and ¯rm 1's
pro¯t is zero. The inequality `=2 · x+2 is equivalent to:
x21 + 2`x1 + ¢=k ¡ 5`2=4 ¸ 0:
Let x+1 denote the largest root of the above equation. We have:
x+1 = ¡` +
p
±2=2 where ±2 = 9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k:
Thus, if x+1 · 0, then for any x1 ¸ 0 we have `=2 · x+2 and there exists some location
x2 2 [`=2; `] for which ¯rm 1's pro¯t is zero. But x+1 · 0 if and only if ¢=k ¸ 5`2=4:
A3. Firm 1's Reduced-form Pro¯t Function ¼^(x1) for ¢ > 0
From Lemma 2, we know that if x1 2
h ¡
9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `; `=2i, then ¯rm 2 captures the
whole market, thus is better o® locating at `=2. Let x1 denote
¡
9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `. We shall
take x1 to be lower than x1, hence D1 (x1; x2) > 0 for all x2 (see Figure 1).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
We ¯rst compute ¯rm 2's best response given ¯rm 1's location. Let ¼i (x1; x2) denote ¯rm i's
reduced-form pro¯t function. From the envelope theorem, we have:
@¼2 (x1; x2)
@x2
=
³
pN2 (x1; x2) ¡ C2
´ Ã@D2 (¢)
@x2
+
@D2 (¢)
@p1
dpN1 (¢)
dx2
!
:
From the expressions in A1 and Lemma 1, it follows that:
@D2 (¢)
@x2
=
5x2 ¡ x1 ¡ 2`
6 (x1 ¡ x2) ¡
¢
6k (x2 ¡ x1)2 ;
@D2 (¢)
@p1
=
1
2k (x2 ¡ x1) ;
dpN1 (¢)
dx2
=
2k (` + x2)
3
:
Hence:
@¼2 (x1; x2)
@x2
=
(k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` ¡ x2 ¡ x1) + ¢) (k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` + x1 ¡ 3x2) ¡ ¢)
18k (x2 ¡ x1)
By assumption x2 > x1. Moreover if ¯rm 2's demand is positive then
k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` ¡ x2 ¡ x1) + ¢ > 0 as can be shown by the following expression:
D2 (x1; x2) =
(k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` ¡ x2 ¡ x1) + ¢)
6k (x2 ¡ x1) =
pN2 (x1; x2) ¡ C2
2k (x2 ¡ x1) :
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Thus, given x1, we must calculate for which value of x2 2 [`=2; `], the expression
k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` + x1 ¡ 3x2) ¡ ¢ is equal to 0, in order to study the ¯rst-order conditions for
maximizing ¼2 (x1; x2). Let us solve the equivalent equation in x2:
¡3x22 + 4 (x1 + `)x2 ¡ x1 (4` + x1) ¡ ¢=k = 0:
Let ±3 (x1) ´ (x1 ¡ 2`)2 ¡ 3¢=k. Straightforward calculations lead to the following:
{ if ¢=k < 3`2=4, then, for any x1 2 [0; `=2], ±3(x1) > 0;
{ if 3`2=4 · ¢=k · 4`2=3, then, for any x1 2 [0; 2` ¡ (3¢=k) 12 ], ±3(x1) ¸ 0
and for any x1 2 (2` ¡ (3¢=k) 12 ; `=2], ±3(x1) < 0;
{ if 4`2=3 < ¢=k, then, for any x1 2 [0; `=2], ±3(x1) < 0:
Figure 2 shows that the constraint x1 < x1 implies that x1 < 2` ¡ (3¢=k) 12 , hence ±3(x1) > 0.
Consequently, the roots x¡2 (x1) and x+2 (x1) are well de¯ned and given by:
x¡2 (x1) =
µ
2 (x1 + `) ¡
q
±3 (x1)
¶
=3 and x+2 (x1) =
µ
2 (x1 + `) +
q
±3 (x1)
¶
=3:
Further calculations lead to the following inequalities:
For any x1 2 [0; x1) : 0 < x¡2 (x1) < `=2 < x+2 (x1):
Indeed, 0 < x¡2 (x1) can be rewritten 0 < 3x21+4`x1+3¢=k, which is met, and `=2 < x+2 (x1) can
be rewritten 4x1 + ` + 2
p
±3 (x1) > 0, which is also veri¯ed. Finally, x¡2 (x1) < `=2 is equivalent
to x21 + 2`x1 ¡ 5`2=4 + ¢=k < 0: letting '(x1) denote x21 + 2`x1 ¡ 5`2=4 + ¢=k, it is useful to
remark that x1 = x1 is the upper root of '(x1) = 0; thus for all x1 < x1 we have '(x1) < 0. A
straightforward consequence of x¡2 (x1) < `=2 is that the pro¯t function ¼2 (x1; x2) admits only
one maximum inside [`=2; `], given either by ` or by x+2 (x1). Moreover, it can be checked that
x+2 (x1) · ` is met for any x1 ¸ (`2 ¡ ¢=k) 12 .
Figure 2 summarizes those results. Three regions are of interest. In region 1 where x1 >
x1;D1 (x1; x2) < 0 for all x2, thus ¯rm 2's best response is to locate at `=2. In region 2 where
x1 < min(x1; (`2 ¡ ¢=k) 12 ); ¯rst D1 (x1; x2) > 0 for all x2 and second x+2 (x1) > `, thus ¯rm 2's
best response is to locate at `. In region 3 where (`2 ¡ ¢=k) 12 < x1 < x1; ¯rst D1 (x1; x2) > 0
for all x2 and second x+2 (x1) < `, thus ¯rm 2's best response is to locate at x
+
2 (x1) : Firm 2's
best responses are depicted in Figure 3 for the di®erent values of ¢=k.
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[Insert Figure 2 here]
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We can now substitute ¯rm 2's best response expressions into ¯rm 1's reduced-form pro¯t
function and get the function ¼^1 (x1), decreasing in x1:
1. If 0 · ¢=k · 3`2=4;
¼^1 (x1) =
8>><>>>:
(k (` ¡ x1) (3` + x1) ¡ ¢)2 =18k (` ¡ x1) ;
if x1 2 [0; ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `)
0; otherwise
2. If 3`2=4 < ¢=k < `2
¼^1 (x1) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
(k (` ¡ x1) (3` + x1) ¡ ¢)2 =18k (` ¡ x1) ;
if x1 2
h
0;
¡
`2 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2i³
k
³
x+2 (x1) ¡ x1
´ ³
2` + x+2 (x1) + x1
´
¡ ¢
´2
=18k
³
x+2 (x1) ¡ x1
´
;
if x1 2
h¡
`2 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ; ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `i
0; otherwise
Using the envelope theorem, we obtain:
@¼1 (x1; x2)
@x2
=
³
pN1 (x1; x2) ¡ C1
´ Ã@D1 (¢)
@x2
+
@D1 (¢)
@p2
dpN2 (¢)
dx2
!
=
³
pN1 (x1; x2) ¡ C1
´
(k (x2 ¡ x1) (2` + 3x2 ¡ x1) + ¢)
6k (x2 ¡ x1)2 :
Hence, given any (x1; x2) 2 [0; `=2] £ [`=2; `], if ¢ > 0 then:
@¼1 (x1; x2)
@x2
> 0:
Thus the function ¼^1 (x1) is continuously decreasing for x1 2
h
0;
¡
9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2 ¡ `i
and non-di®erentiable at x1 =
¡
`2 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2.
3. If `2 · ¢=k < 5`2=4
¼^1 (x1) =
8>><>>:
³
k
³
x+2 (x1) ¡ x1
´³
2` + x+2 (x1) + x1
´
¡ ¢
´2
=18k
³
x+2 (x1) ¡ x1
´
;
if x1 2
h
0; ¡` + ¡9`2=4 ¡ ¢=k¢1=2´
0; otherwise
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A4. Proof of Lemma 3
We know from A3 above that
D2 (x1; x2) =
pN2 (x1; x2) ¡ C2
2k (x2 ¡ x1) =
k (x2 ¡ x1) (4` ¡ x2 ¡ x1) + ¢
6k (x2 ¡ x1)
Since x2 > x1, then D2 (x1; x2) > 0 is equivalent to the following inequality:
x21 ¡ 4`x1 + 4`x2 ¡ x22 + ¢=k > 0:
Let ±4 and x¡1 denote respectively the discriminant and the lower root of equation x21 ¡ 4`x1 +
4`x2 ¡ x22 + ¢=k = 0. Their expression is given by:
±4 = (2` ¡ x2)2 ¡ ¢=k and x¡1 = ¡` +
p
±4:
The higher root is obviously always higher than `=2 for any x1 2 [0; `=2], hence doesn't matter.
Thus, if x¡1 2 [0; `=2], then for any x1 ¸ x¡1 , we have D2 (x1; x2) = 0 and if x¡1 > `=2, then for
any x1 2 [0; `=2], we have D2 (x1; x2) > 0.
The inequality x¡1 > `=2 can be rewritten as follows:
x22 ¡ 4`x2 + 7`2=4 ¡ ¢=k < 0:
Let x¡2 denote the smallest root of equation x22 ¡ 4`x2 + 7`2=4 ¡ ¢=k = 0. If x¡2 < `, then for
any x2 > x¡2 , we have x¡1 > `=2. One can show that x¡2 = 2`¡
¡
9`2=4 + ¢=k
¢1=2 < ` if and only
if ¡5`2=4 < ¢=k:
A5. Firms 1's Reduced-form Pro¯t Function for ¢ < 0
By using the envelope theorem, we can write:
@¼^1 (x1)
@x1
=
@¼1 (x1; `)
@x1
=
³
pN1 (x1; `) ¡ C1
´ Ã@D1 (x1; `)
@x1
+
@D1 (x1; `)
@p2
¢ dp
N
2 (x1; `)
dx1
!
where from A1 above and Lemma 1,
D1 (x1; `) =
pN2 ¡ pN1
2k (` ¡ x1) +
x1 + `
2
@D1 (¢)
@x1
=
3` ¡ 5x1
6 (` ¡ x1) ¡
¢
6k (` ¡ x1)2 and
@D1 (¢)
@p2
=
1
2k (` ¡ x1)
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dpN2 (¢)
dx1
=
2k (x1 ¡ 2`)
3
Hence:
@¼^1 (x1)
@x1
=
³
pN1 (x1; `) ¡ C1
´ (k (x1 ¡ `) (` + 3x1) ¡ ¢)
6k (` ¡ x1)2
We thus have sign@¼^1=@x1 = sign(k (x1 ¡ `) (` + 3x1) ¡ ¢). The study of equation k (x1 ¡ `) (` + 3x1)¡
¢ = 0 in x1, which admits k
¡
4k`2 + 3¢
¢
as a discriminant, shows that there does not exist any
real root for ¢=k < ¡4`2=3 and there exists at least one root otherwise, more precisely two
when ¡4`2=3 < ¢=k. Both of them are critical points for the function ¼^1 (x1) de¯ned on IR.
Moreover the lower root is a local maximizer and the upper root is a local minimizer for any
value of ¢=k > ¡4`2=3 since the in°exion point is a global minimizer of @¼^1=@x1.
Let us compute @¼^1=@x1 respectively at 0 and `=2:
@¼^1 (0)
@x1
=
³
pN1 (0; `) ¡ C1
´Ã
¡¢ + k`
2
6k`2
!
<
>
0 i® ¢=k
>
<
¡ `2
@¼^1 (`=2)
@x1
=
³
pN1 (`=2; `) ¡ C1
´Ã
¡4¢ + 5k`
2
6k`2
!
<
>
0 i® ¢=k
>
<
¡ 5`2=4;
from which we conclude: if ¢=k 2 ¡¡4`2=3; ¡5`2=4¤, then both the local maximizer and mini-
mizer of ¼^1 (x1) belongs to [0; `=2]; if ¢=k 2 ¡¡5`2=4; ¡`2¢, then ¼^1 (x1) admits only the local
maximizer in [0; `=2] and the local minimizer is higher than `=2; ¯nally if ¢=k 2 ¡¡`2; 0¢, then
¼^1 (x1) is strictly decreasing on [0; `=2] since the local maximizer is lower than 0 and the local
minimizer is higher than `=2.
Thus a su±cient condition for ¼^1 (x1) to admit one and only one maximizer in [0; `=2] is to
consider values of ¢=k in the interval
¡¡5`2=4; 0¢. We can de¯ne ¼^1 (x1) explicitly: if ¡5`2=4 <
¢=k, then, for any x1 2 [0; `=2]
¼^1 (x1) =
(k (` ¡ x1) (3` + x1) ¡ ¢)2
18k (` ¡ x1) :
The maximizer denoted xN1 in the text, is di®erent or equal to 0 depending upon the level of
¢=k, namely:
xN1 =
8>><>>:
³
` ¡ ¡4`2 + 3¢=k¢1=2´ =3 > 0; if ¢=k 2 ¡¡5`2=4; ¡`2¤
0; if ¢=k 2 £¡`2; 0¤
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since for any value of ¢=k 2 ¡¡5`2=4; ¡`2¤:
@¼^1 (x1) =@x1
>
<
0 i® x1
<
>
µ
` ¡
³
4`2 + 3¢=k
´1=2¶
=3;
and for any value of ¢=k 2 £¡`2; 0¤:
@¼^1 (x1) =@x1 · 0 whatever x1 2 [0; `=2] :
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FOOTNOTES
1. It could be argued that real transportation costs tend to be concave rather than convex; this
may be the case in geographic space but clearly not a convincing argument in preference space.
2. Boyer et al. (1994, 1995) used re¯nements, such as the intuitive criterion and the D1 divinity
criterion, to obtain a unique separating equilibrium, namely the one which involves the smallest
distortion cost for the e±cient incumbent, and a unique pooling equilibrium. Boyer et al. (2001)
consider entry prevention in a location model of incomplete information with ¯xed and sunk
entry costs.
3. See Appendix A5 for an explicit de¯nition of ¼^1 (x1) in this case.
4. This situation is captured by a standard signaling game in locations; see Boyer et al. (1994,
1995).
5. In the language of signaling games, the assumption of stochastic dominance is not satis¯ed
(see Cho and Sobel, 1990, assumption A3 page 391; or Mailath et alii, 1993, assumption 2 page
255), that is, for any ¹ 2 [0; 1] and given x1 such that ¯rm 1's pro¯t is positive, x^2 (x1; ¹) = `.
For values of ¢=k 2 ¡`2; 5`2=4¢, x^2 (x1; ¹) could be strictly lower than ` for some ¹ and some
x1 and the analysis would then be the same as in Boyer et al. (1994, 1995).
6. The problem of entry deterrence under incomplete information in a spatial context is studied
in Boyer et al. (2001).
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FIGURE 3
Firm 2's best response functions
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